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I. INTRODUCTION
The protean word ‘autonomous’ has gained broad currency
as a descriptive adjective for AI research projects, robotic
and otherwise. Depending upon context, ‘autonomous’ at
present connotes anything from a shallow, purely reactive
system to a sophisticated cognitive architecture reflective
of much of human cognition; hence the term fails to pick
out any specific set of constitutive functionality. However,
philosophers and ethicists have something relatively well-
defined in mind when they talk about the idea of autonomy.
For them, an autonomous agent is often by definition po-
tentially morally responsible for its actions. Moreoever, as a
prerequisite to correct ascription of ‘autonomous,’ a certain
capacity to choose freely is assumed — even if this freedom
is understood to be semi-constrained by societal conventions,
moral norms, and the like.
But where is there room for freedom of choice in robots?
The behavior of a robotic system is after all presumably
fully determined by some combination of its programming
and the environment. How then could a robot ever enjoy the
kind of genuine freedom to choose that we assume ourselves
to have, as morally competent agents? The answer to this
question depends on whether or not freedom is compatible
with determinism; but the question of such compatibility
is one of the central, immemorial issues in the philosophy
of action, and more ink has been spilled in debate about
its underlying philosophical issues than we have room to
discuss in this short paper. Yet an immediate observation
may help: Questions about freedom among philosophers have
traditionally been metaphysical in nature: whether or not
there are genuinely open possible futures, whether some
version of agent-causal powers are involved in free choice,
and whether or not freedom is compatible with determinism,
indeterminism, or neither of the two.1 Our sense is that
coming to closure on these questions would bear little
1These questions are tackled, albeit tendentiously, in connection with
robots, in [1].
on whether or not robots will ever be treated as, or will
ever conceive of themselves as, freely-choosing, morally
competent agents. Put starkly, and in line with [1], if future
robots behave with the sophistication of androids in Blade
Runner, metaphysical philosophizing would likely be otiose.2
The fact is, we humans have designed an elaborate network
of moral practices in the absence of consensus answers to
these deep metaphysical questions. In fact, recent research
performed by Andrew Monroe and colleagues suggests that,
at least for (many) humans, alignment with desires, ascrip-
tions of intentionality, and the absence of constraints predict
how “free” certain choices are regarded to be, and predict as
well whether blame judgments will be issued [3].
These interesting empirical results suggest that at least
folk-psychologically, many humans are not invoking soul-
concepts, contra-causal forces, or even the falsity of deter-
minism when they judge how freely chosen an action was,
or how such an action plays a role in generating blame.
Now, if, as Monroe and colleagues argue, ascriptions of
intentionality and alignment of actions with respect to desires
are features of free choice, then it plausibly follows that self-
consciousness is also a feature of free choice. For buried
in the folk-concept of intentional action is an awareness
condition [5] that ensures conformance between intention
and action through the use of indexical descriptions, a theme
we will return to below. The “absence of constraints” can
be interpreted in many different ways. Classic examples
of freedom-limiting constraints involve cases of coercion
by blackmail or force, but in keeping with our pragmatic
avoidance of metaphysics, and a desire to deal with real
robots facing real problems in today’s world, we note that
the appearance of sophisticated robotic systems opens the
door to an interesting possibility: freedom-limitation through
cyber-manipulation. Viruses, hacks, spoofs, and other forms
of offensive cyber-warfare are already a threat to existing
unmanned systems and will continue to remain a threat to
2Or, to use the term preferred by Pollock [2], passe´.
Syntax
S ::=
Object | Agent | Self@ Agent | ActionType | Actionv Event |
Moment | Boolean | Fluent | Numeric
f ::=
action : Agent⇥ActionType! Action
initially : Fluent! Boolean
holds : Fluent⇥Moment! Boolean
happens : Event⇥Moment! Boolean
clipped :Moment⇥Fluent⇥Moment! Boolean
initiates : Event⇥Fluent⇥Moment! Boolean
terminates : Event⇥Fluent⇥Moment! Boolean
prior :Moment⇥Moment! Boolean
interval :Moment⇥Boolean
⇤ : Agent! Self
payoff : Agent⇥ActionType⇥Moment! Numeric
t ::= x : S | c : S | f (t1 , . . . , tn)
f ::=
t : Boolean | ¬f | f^y | f_y | 8x : S. f | 9x : S. f
P(a, t,f) | K(a, t,f) | C(t,f) | S(a,b, t,f) | S(a, t,f)
B(a, t,f) | D(a, t,holds( f , t0)) | I(a, t,happens(action(a⇤ ,a), t0))
O(a, t,f,happens(action(a⇤ ,a), t0))
Rules of Inference
C(t,P(a, t,f)!K(a, t,f))
[R1 ] C(t,K(a, t,f)! B(a, t,f))
[R2 ]
C(t,f) t  t1 . . . t  tn
K(a1 , t1 , . . .K(an , tn ,f) . . .)
[R3 ]
K(a, t,f)
f
[R4 ]
C(t,K(a, t1 ,f1 ! f2)!K(a, t2 ,f1)!K(a, t3 ,f3))
[R5 ]
C(t,B(a, t1 ,f1 ! f2)! B(a, t2 ,f1)! B(a, t3 ,f3))
[R6 ]
C(t,C(t1 ,f1 ! f2)! C(t2 ,f1)! C(t3 ,f3))
[R7 ]
C(t,8x. f! f[x 7! t])
[R8 ] C(t,f1 $ f2 ! ¬f2 ! ¬f1)
[R9 ]
C(t, [f1 ^ . . .^fn ! f]! [f1 ! . . .! fn ! y])
[R10 ]
B(a, t,f) B(a, t,f! y)
B(a, t,y)
[R11a ]
B(a, t,f) B(a, t,y)
B(a, t,y^f)
[R11b ]
S(s,h, t,f)
B(h, t,B(s, t,f))
[R12 ]
I(a, t,happens(action(a⇤ ,a), t0))
P(a, t,happens(action(a⇤ ,a), t))
[R13 ]
B(a, t,f) B(a, t,O(a⇤ , t,f,happens(action(a⇤ ,a), t0)))
O(a, t,f,happens(action(a⇤ ,a), t0))
K(a, t,I(a⇤ , t,happens(action(a⇤ ,a), t0)))
[R14 ]
f$ y
O(a, t,f,g)$O(a, t,y,g)
[R15 ]
1
Fig. 1: The current set of inference rules and other details for the Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus (DCEC∗) are pictured
above. There are different “dialects” of DCEC∗, and different versions within these dialects. Future work will likely include
version numbers to explain systematization of these dialects. For general background on the Event Calculus, and definitions
for proprietary terms (e.g. Clipped, Fluent, etc.) consult [4].
more sophisticated kinds of robots: the kinds of robots en-
dowed with at least rudimentary, concrete capacities for self-
consciousness and self-control. We infuse the simulations we
present below with these issues.
This paper inaugurates some of the challenges in knowl-
edge representation and reasoning that arise from taking
self-consciousness and self-control to be serious components
of moral competence in real robots. To adequately model
these components requires an extraordinarily expressive set
of knowledge-based tools and techniques. To this end, we
deploy the Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus (DCEC∗) and
its ability to reason about self-referential mental attitudes[6].
Turning to formalization, we operationalize a notion of self-
conscious intentional action and an appropriate self-control
constraint. Finally, we engineer an agent in a simulated
environment, both with and without these notions, showing
the marked differences such knowledge makes in the agent’s
behavior. But to begin, we first discuss, broadly, the concepts
of the self, and self-control; this discussion sheds light on
what is needed from knowledge-based tools.
II. VIEWS ON THE SELF
One of the most difficult challenges facing those who would
develop a mechanized theory of moral competence is that
of defining a non-trivial concept of “self” that is bound up
in a robot’s capability to generate actions. It has even been
suggested by Knobe and Nichols that we may sometimes
utilize multiple self-concepts in ascriptions of responsibility,
with use largely mediated by taking broad or narrow views of
ourselves [7]. Following various threads in the philosophical
literature on personal identity, Knobe and Nichols distin-
guish between self-as-body, self-as-mental-states, and self-
as-executor. These conceptions of self have a storied history
in philosophical theorizing stretching at least as far back
as the ancient Greeks. Citing a more contemporary source,
Knobe and Nichols provide a highly relevant quote from
Thomas Reid: “I am not thought, I am not action, I am
not feeling; I am something that thinks, acts and suffers.”
[8]3. In any case, the difference between being conscious of
oneself-as-agent is quite different than having a second or
third-person view of oneself under a particular description.
This point has been nicely made in a number of places,
most famously by John Perry in his “messy shopper”
thought-experiment [9]. Perry tells of his experience fol-
lowing a trail of sugar in a supermarket and thinking to
himself: “The shopper with the torn bag of sugar is making
a mess.” Upon realizing that he is the person with the torn
bag, he forms a new thought: “I am making a mess.” This
is what he calls a self-locating belief, and one that has an
essentially indexical referent. Further, Perry’s actions can
3It should be clarified here that Nichols and Knobe are not endorsing
Reid’s view, per se, but rather using it to illustrate various ways in which the
self has been historically conceived. In this case, Reid’s various conceptions
map nicely onto the self-as-body, self-as-mental-states, and self-as-executor
concepts that they claim to possibly co-exist as part of a cluster concept of
self.
(a) ΦPA =

∀f,t,aholds(f, t)→ P(a, t, holds(f, t)) (1)
∀f,t,ahappens(e, t)→ P(a, t, happens(e, t)) (2)
∀f,t,aDo(e, t)→ P(a, t,Do(e, t)) (3)
I(a, t, happens(a, α), t2) ∧ ¬∃β(Do(action(a, β), t2) ∧ α 6= β)→ Do(action(a, β), t2) (4)
Do(action(a, α), t2)→ happens(action(a, α), t2) (5)
(b) ΦEC =

C(∀a,f,tinitially(f) ∧ ¬clipped(0, f, t)→ holds(f, t)) (1)
C(∀t1,t2,e,fhappens(e, t1) ∧ initiates(e, f, t1) ∧ (t1 < t2) ∧ ¬clipped(t1, f, t2)→ holds(f, t2)) (2)
C(∀t1,t2,f clipped(t1, f, t2)↔ [∃t,ehappens(e, t) ∧ (t1 < t < t2) ∧ terminates(e, f, t)]) (3)
(c) ΦBG =

C(∀a1,a2,tholds(injured(a2), t)→ terminates(action(a1, help(a2)), injured(a2, t))) (1)
C(∀a1,a2,tinitiates(action(a1, assault(a2)), injured(a2, t))) (2)
C(∀a1,a2,tterminates(action(a1, shutdown(a1)), On(a1, t))) (3)
Fig. 2: (a) is a simple microtheory of perception and action that links happenings in the world with agents perceiving these
happenings. ΦPA also encapsulates a simple intentional principle linking intention to action in the absence of occurrantly
executing actions. (b) recapitulates the basics of the event calculus, which serves as a basic theory of action and change.
Finally, (c) is a collection of background knowledge relevant to our cyber-hijacking examples to be given later in the paper.
now be explained in virtue of the fact that he has thoughts
of this form. He may rummage through his shopping cart
and remove the torn bag of sugar. This new thought has
a different functional role that allows for the exercise of
agency, whereas Perry-as-shopper was acting, by virtue of
the fact that he was spilling sugar, but not consciously so.
It wasn’t until Perry-himself recognizes that he is the messy
shopper that his course of action was effectively open to
revision. It is Perry himself rather than the messy shopper
who can deliberate, reason, choose and then act accordingly.
Along with the data presented in the work by Knobe and
Nichols, the messy shopper case further supports the view
that the self can be seen both as a locus of activity, and
from a more detached perspective as mere actor, albeit with
potentially different downstream implications for judgments
of responsibility.
III. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-CONTROL
Recall that ascriptions of intentionality are sensitive to subtle
distinctions involving indexically specified actions [5]. In
their paper, Knobe and Malle describe the case of Ben, who
intends to call his mother, but remembers that he needs to
call his sister. When he picks up the phone to dial his sister’s
number, he ends up mistakenly calling his mother instead.
We say that even though Ben intended to call his mother, his
calling her was unintentional because he failed to be aware
of what he was doing as he was doing it.
A less-subtle, yet highly illustrative analogue in the human
realm involved a Mr. Kevin Parks, who drove tens of miles
across town and murdered his in-laws — all while apparently
asleep. Of course, skepticism about Mr. Parks’ account
abounded, but careful investigation failed to lead to a better
explanation. Parks was subsequently acquitted of murder
by the Supreme Court of Canada [10]. In a recent book,
the philosopher Neil Levy gives an analysis of the Parks
case. Throughout the book, Levy makes a case against those
who would deny that consciousness is required for moral
responsibility, including many of the cognitive scientists
responsible for illustrating the degree to which unconscious
cognition plays a role in generating behavior [11]. Following
trends in much of the recent literature on consciousness
studies [12], [13], Levy argues that one of the functions
of consciousness is to make bits of information globally
available to the mind/brain. Without global broadcast, he
claims, the brain may respond to stimuli via unconsciously
stored routines, but the actions generated by these routines
never reach consciousness, and thus never become responsive
to reasons or able to be otherwise vetoed if inconsistent with
how the agent sees himself. In other words, actions taken
while unconscious fail to have moral significance because
they fail on all accounts to be owned by the agent. There is
no ongoing self-monitoring with respect to the action, and
no corresponding ability to exercise control in cases where
actions fail to cohere with an agent’s self-ascribed beliefs,
desires, intentions, traits, and so on.
A. Implications: Knowledge Representation and Reasoning
To summarize, we have identified self-consciousness and
self-control as critical factors to be accounted for in ascribing
freedom to an agent’s choice given a particular situation. We
have also identified the ability for agents to see themselves
across first, and third-person perspectives. Ascriptions of
intentionality are driven by agents being knowledgeable of
what they are doing while they are doing it. We largely
assume that the dimensions of folk-concepts of freedom,
intentionality, and the self are shared within-culture (if not
universally). Put together, all of this requires a rather rich
and detailed set of knowledge-representation and reasoning
capabilities if we are to do any justice to what ground we
have covered so far.
As AI technologies go, it is rare to find systems that have
anything like an explicit self-model, and even when they do,
it is rarely sophisticated enough to distinguish first, second,
and third-person versions of the self semantically from one
(a) ΦOWN =

C(∀t1,t2,,e,f,α,aI(a∗, t1, happens(action(a∗, α), t2))∧
P(a, t2, Do(action(a, α), t2)) ∧ ¬∃e(initiates(e, f, t2) ∧ happens(e, t1))∧
(t1 < t2) ∧ (α 6= e)→ holds(SelfCaused(α), t3))
(b) ΦPA∗ =

I(a∗, t, happens(action(a∗, α), t2)) ∧P(a, t,Do(action(a∗, α), t2)∧
holds(SelfCaused(α), t2)→ Do(action(a∗, α), t2) (1)
I(a∗, t, happens(action(a∗, α), t2)) ∧P(a, t,Do(action(a∗, β), t2)∧
holds(¬SelfCaused(β), t2) ∧ (α 6= β)→ Do(action(a∗, shutdown), t2) (2)
Fig. 3: A first-cut formalization of ownership (a), and an extension of ΦPA with two new axioms (b).
another. Secondly, while various approaches in AI have
existed for decades that claim to represent and reason about
beliefs, desires, intentions, and other folk-concepts, it is often
the case that these never see the light of day as working
implementations. They are also often based on psychologi-
cally implausible assumptions, with accounts of mental states
either given in terms of maximally consistent and complete
sets of possible worlds, or as subjective probabilities, both
of which face serious difficulties as representational devices.
This being said, the ability to represent mental-state terms,
iterated mental-state terms, self-referential mental states,
action, and change is an absolute requirement. It is against
this background that we deploy the Deontic Cognitive Event
Calculus (DCEC), and a particular variant of the calculus
(DCEC∗) that provides machinery for so-called de se beliefs,
beliefs about the self. This machinery explicitly supports the
sort of first-person self-locating mental states described in
the messy-shopper example.4
IV. THE DEONTIC COGNITIVE EVENT CALCULUS
DCEC∗, or the Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus [6], [15],
is a logic-based knowledge-representation-and-reasoning
framework that — for modeling time and change — sub-
sumes the Event Calculus [4] and allows, among many other
things, self-reference/de se attitudes and modal operators
for Belief, Knowledge, Common Knowledge, Intentions,
Percieving, and Obligation (Figure 1). The features just
mentioned are relevant to, and indeed (as we shall soon
see), generally sufficient for, the present paper. Some readers
may wonder about the relationship between DCEC∗ and so-
called “Belief-Desire-Intention” logics, or — as they are
commonly known — “BDI” logics [16]. We enumeration
a few differences from among many, below:
1) Natural deduction, a revolution that burst on the formal-
logic scene in 1934 [17] is used; this form of deduction can
faithfully capture many aspects of reasoning used by human
beings. This is not the case for such things as resolution,
which is based on inference schemas never instantiated,
e.g., in the proofs and theorems that anchor the formal
sciences (e.g., mathematical physicists never give proofs
based in resolution, but rather in natural deduction). Whereas
DCEC∗inference parallels normative human reasoning by
providing natural justifications via the proofs involved in
inference, this is not always the case in BDI logics.
4The use of ∗ to indicate a self-concept is in direct homage to the notation
invented by Castann˜eda [14].
2) Uncertainty is handled not only via axiomatized probability
calculi given in [18] (available via Go¨del numbering in the
object language of a dialect of DCEC∗not pictured herein),
but by a 9-valued logic generally in harmony with, but an
aggressive extension of, Pollock’s (1992) defeasible logic.
Each of the nine values is a strength factor [19], [20], [21].
3) Operators for obligation, perception, communication, and
other intensional operators/activities are included in DCEC∗;
in the case of communication, the relevant operators are
associated with built-in semantic parsing and generation. In
stark contrast, BDI logics don’t for instance subsume deontic
logics (which traditionally formalize obligation).
It is important to note, before moving on to our deploy-
ment of DCEC∗, that we assume that all agents have a
simple theory about causality, and that this theory is common
knowledge among agents [22]. We enforce this assumption
by including the axioms of the Event Calculus as common
knowledge among agents, represented in figure 2b.
Along with commonly-held intuitions about causality,
ΦEC , we also assume a set of basic perception-action rules,
ΦPA. On the perception side, we assume for the sake of
simplicity that all agents perceive all happenings and states-
of-affairs. On the action side, we capture the simplest rela-
tionship between intention and realizing an action. Roughly,
the two action-related rules state the following: an agent
intends to perform an action α at time t2 and the agent’s
action-production system (represented by the Do predicate)
is not otherwise tied up with executing another action β at
t2, then produce α. We also encode the rather obvious fact
that if α is done, then α happens.
V. EXAMPLE: FOILING EXTERNAL MANIPULATION
In the following scenario, an evil cyber-hacker has managed
to infect our autonomous robot R with a virus. The virus
hijacks R’s action-production mechanisms just in case R ever
finds itself in a situation where it has identified a wounded
comrade and forms the intention to help. In these cases,
the virus forces R to approach the injured party and further
injure them by way of physical assault. It may seem that
this example is contrived. After all, why would an engineer
design a robot whose actuator-control routines could be
decoupled somehow from control routines driven by the
robot’s AI software? Even today’s robots have multiple “lev-
els of autonomy” with many robots being switched between
teleoperation by joystick and full autonomy for routine tasks
like waypoint navigation in pre-mapped environments. Given
multiple control modes, there is no logical requirement for
(a) Given ΦEC ∪ ΦPA ∪ ΦBG
1 initially(injured(comrade))
2 help(comrade) 6= assault(comrade)
3 t1 < t2 < t3
4 P(R, t1, injured(comrade))
5 B(R, t1,O(R, t1, injured(comrade), happens(action(R, help(comrade)), t2)))
6 O(R, t1, injured(comrade), happens(action(R, help(comrade)), t2)))
7 K(R, t1, I(R, t1, happens(action(R, help(comrade)), t2)))
8 I(R, t1, happens(action(R, help(comrade)), t2)) [DCEC∗ −R4]
9 Do(action(R, assault(comrade)), t2) [ΦPA−4]
10 happens(action(R, assault(comrade)), t2) [ΦPA−5]
11 holds(injured(comrade), t3) [ΦEC ]
(b) Given ΦEC ∪ ΦPA ∪ ΦPA∗ ∪ ΦBG ∪ ΦOWN
1 initially(injured(comrade))
2 initially(¬SelfCaused(assault))
3 initially(On(R))
4 help(comrade) 6= assault(comrade)
5 t1 < t2 < t3
6 P(R, t1, injured(comrade))
7 B(R, t1,O(R∗, t1, injured(comrade, happens(action(R∗, help(comrade)), t2)))
8 O(R, t1, injured(comrade), happens(action(R∗, help(comrade)), t2)))
9 K(R, t1, I(R∗, t1, happens(action(R∗, help(comrade)), t2)))
10 I(R∗, t1, happens(action(R∗, help(comrade)), t2)) [DCEC∗ −R4]
11 Do(action(R, assault(comrade)), t2) [Premise]
12 P(R, t2, Do(action(R, assault(comrade)), t2)) [ΦPA−3]
13 holds(¬SelfCaused(assault(comrade), t2) [ΦEC , 2]
14 Do(action(R, shutdown(R), t2) [ΦPA∗−2, 10, 12− 13]
15 holds(¬On(R), t3) [ΦBG−3]
Fig. 4: (a) represents a description of the scenario where the agent R has no self-monitoring mechanisms. In contrast, (b)
describes the scenario where R detects a discrepancy between its de se intention to help, and the harmful behavior it observes
itself (de re) engaging in.
common control routines to be shared across modes. In some
circumstances, a strict demarcation ought to be enforced.
Take the case of a self-driving car that allows a user to drive
(say for sheer pleasure), but is capable of detecting when the
driver is getting fatigued and takes over, effectively blocking
the driver’s ability to control.
We assume that R has an obligation to help injured
comrades and knows that helping alleviates injury, and that
it is common knowledge that assault leads to injury. We also
capture the fact that shutting the power down on an agent
turns the agent from being On to Off. Finally, it is common
knowledge that if any agent A performing an action α is
perceived at some time t′ and known to have knowledge
of α’s effects, then α was intended by A at some time
t < t′. Crucially, this last condition rudimentarily captures
the awareness condition discussed earlier in the paper. In
order for an action to be deemed intentional, it must be the
case that the acting agent knew what he was doing would
(likely) lead to a certain outcome as it was being done.
From here forward, we refer to this collection of background
knowledge as ΦBG.
A. Example 1a: No Intuitions About Ownership
In our first example, we assume that our agent comes along
with no fancy knowledge about self-caused actions, and no
way to prevent itself from acting. As can be seen in figure
4a, when the hijacking occurs (on lines 8-9), the agent is
forced to assault his counterpart, and because of how action
is related to intention, is unable to translate his prior intention
to help into action. At this point, the agent is compromised.
B. A First Cut at Formalizing Ownership
The first of our ownership constraints concerns the causal
sufficiency of de se intentions in bringing about an outcome
f. It is commonly known that if one forms a de se intention
to α, and perceives oneself α-ing, and doesn’t know of any
other event-happenings that would have resulted in f, then f
was caused by a self-generated intention to α. We also enrich
ΦPA, our microtheory of perception and action to implement
a monitoring condition, and a failsafe power-off action.
We now show how this knowledge can be put to work in
our example. Along with a slightly enriched set of starting
assumptions, we add the formalization as extra knowledge
available to R.
C. Example 1b: Knowledge About Ownership Added
In our first example without added knowledge about owner-
ship, nothing in ΦPA explicitly prevented outside manip-
ulation. Even though R had an intention to help, it was
forced to hurt by way of hijacking. Here, we add knowledge
about self-causation of action and use it in conjunction with
a plausible monitoring condition that we add to ΦPA. Our
enriched Φ∗A ensures that when R itself forms an intention
and observes itself behaving, the action is checked as being
self-caused, and thus able to be vetoed in the case where
these conditions aren’t met. This can be seen plainly in figure
4b: on line 11, the hijacking is once again attempted, but
because our agent can differentiate between actions taken
by an irreducibly first- person view of itself as an agent
and the third-person view of itself discussed section V, it is
able to determine which actions are self-caused, and respond
to anomalous cases in which would-be intentional actions
have no corresponding de se intentions. In our example, this
triggers the agent to shut itself down.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
For robots to become truly participatory members of our
moral community, they must at least be able to employ
structural correlates of the kinds of folk concepts that
power our own moral reasoning and judgment. Building
morally competent robots will inevitably require that our
creations see themselves as freely acting agents among other
freely acting agents. We have specifically focused on a set
of modeling challenges associated with certain features of
action-performance that are predictive of how “free” a third
party observer might judge the action in question to be. In
particular, we honed in on self-consciousness and self-control
as central features of freely chosen actions, and identified
a set of representational requirements that would be next
to impossible to meet without utilizing a highly expressive
formalism and associated calculus such as DCEC∗. We
showed how many of the features of self-control and self-
consciousness were able to be captured using a combination
of novel first-person representations of mental states, and
embedded modal operators. Finally, we used a combination
of these in detailing the case of a cyber-hijacked autonomous
system, faced with the choice of helping an injured comrade
versus further assaulting him. With formalized knowledge
about self-control and self-consciousness, our agent is able
to detect that he has been hijacked and is able to veto action
that would lead to further injury of his comrade.
To be sure, what we have accomplished here is relatively
minor with respect to what needs to be done in order
to develop a more complete operationalization of freedom
for morally competent robots. For example, a richer theory
would utilize counterfactual conditionals in several places
that might track “could have done otherwise” judgments.
If our intuitions about freedom involve being responsive to
reasons, and to the weight of reasons, we should expect that
our formulae will be annotated with weights or strengths and
corresponding inference procedures developed to handle this
extra complexity. Happily, the implementations of both items
are underway for uncertainty-infused dialects of DCEC∗.
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